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1.  Introduction 
Backward vertical linkages of multinationals are becoming one of the most 
important issues in the fields of international trade and development economics for two 
reasons. One is the growing international backward linkages. We have witnessed the 
rapid expansion of foreign trade in intermediate goods but the rate of increase in such 
trade does not seem attributable only to the reduction in trade barriers.
1 Instead, 
growing international backward linkages by multinationals, or intermediate input trade 
between headquarter and foreign affiliates, have been contributed significantly to the 
rapid expansion of intermediate goods trade (Kleinert, 2001).
2 
The second reason is increased interest in local backward linkages, or local 
procurements for host countries. It is particularly important for developing countries to 
identify the determinants of local procurements of multinationals.
3 This is because the 
host country could enhance the potential benefits of hosting foreign direct investment 
(FDI) with the increase in local procurements.
4 For instance, supporting industries in 
the host countries are expected to grow, as local procurements increase. Moreover, 
vertical backward linkages could contribute to the technology transfer from 
multinationals to domestic firms (Javorcik, 2004). 
In light of the growing importance of vertical backward linkages, it appears for 
Japanese multinationals that local backward linkages grew much faster than the 
international backward linkages. Table 1 presents the local and imported inputs of 
Japanese foreign affiliates for the period 1990-2000.
5 Imports of affiliates in every 
                                                        
1  For instance, using confidential U.S. affiliate level data over the period 1983-92, Feinberg and 
Keane (2001) found that the imports of U.S. affiliates in Canada did not have a statistically 
significant relationship with the reduction of tariffs in Canada. 
2  Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001) measured the degree of vertical linkages, using input-output tables 
from 10 OECD and four emerging market countries between 1970 and 1990. They found that the use 
of imported inputs to produce exported goods grew about 30 percent during 1970-90. Similarly, 
Yeats (2001) found that the growth of trade in inputs, which now account for 30 percent of world 
trade in manufactures, was much faster than the growth of trade in final goods. 
3  See, for instance, Lowe and Kenney (1999) for discussion of the consumer electronics industry in 
Mexico and Kelegama and Foley (1999) for discussion of the garment industry in Sri Lanka. 
UNCTAD (2001) reviews several policies to promote linkages between foreign affiliates and 
domestic firms, including local content requirements. 
4  “Several less-developed and newly industrializing countries in Asia and Latin America have 
instituted formal local content requirements for foreign investors, while others have made 
preferential investment status conditional on local content, or have put informal pressure on foreign 
investors to extend their vertical linkages,” (Belderbos, Capannelli, and Fukao, 2001). Local content 
requirements have become illegal under the terms of the trade-related investment measures (TRIMs) 
agreement in the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
5  A detailed description of the data will be provided in Section 2.2.   2
region expanded from 1991-1995 to 1996-2000. Table 1 clearly shows that the growth 
of local procurements has been much faster than the growth of imports. Accordingly, the 
ratio of local inputs to total intermediate inputs in the foreign affiliates of Japanese 
multinationals increased throughout the period. 
 
=== Table 1 === 
 
Despite its importance, only a few studies have examined the determinants of 
vertical backward linkages of multinationals at the affiliate-level. Hanson, Mataloni, 
and Slaughter (2005) focused on international vertical backward linkages. They 
investigated affiliate demand for imported inputs as a function of trade costs, factor 
prices, and other control variables. Based on U.S. manufacturing firm-level panel data 
in 1994, they found that demand for imported inputs became high if the trade costs were 
low, if the wages of less-skilled labor (relative to those of skilled labor) were low, and if 
corporate income tax rates were low. 
Belderbos, Capannelli, and Fukao (2001) examined local backward linkages for 
Japanese electronics manufacturing affiliates. Using foreign affiliate-level data for 1992, 
they conduct cross-section regression analysis. The results indicated that the local 
procurements of Japanese foreign affiliates depended on the quality of infrastructure, 
the size of the local supporting industry or components suppliers, and local content 
regulations.
6 
These studies have made significant contributions to the literature. However, 
there still exists room for further investigation. First, these studies did not take into 
account the unobservable affiliate heterogeneity. Hanson, Mataloni, and Slaughter 
(2005) used panel data but their study is based on firm-level data rather than 
affiliate-level data. Belderbos, Capannelli, and Fukao (2001) used affiliate-level data but 
their study is cross-section analysis. The recent literature on international trade has 
revealed that the trade patterns of plants (or firms) were different even in a given 
industry.
7 Indeed, local procurement patterns do not seem to be fully explained by the 
industry-level factor. 
Figure 1 presents the distribution of local procurement ratio for Japanese foreign 
affiliates in four major industries (textiles, general machinery, electric machinery, and 
                                                        
6  In addition, Belderbos, Capannelli, and Fukao (2000, 2001) investigated the determinants of local 
content, which is defined as the sales of the foreign affiliates, minus components and materials 
imported from abroad, divided by the sales of affiliates. 
7  See, for instance, Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003).   3
transportation equipment) in 2000. The local procurement ratio is defined as the share of 
local intermediate inputs in the total costs.
8 In textiles, although the average local 
procurement ratio is 0.38, more than one-fifth of firms lie in less than 0.1. Similar facts 
are confirmed in other three industries, implying that the heterogeneity of local 
procurements exists and therefore local procurement patterns do not seem to be 
explained very well by the industry-level factor. Some of this heterogeneity can be 
explained by observable affiliate characteristics. But we should note that affiliate 
heterogeneity is not necessarily observed. Given these considerations, without 
controlling for affiliate-level heterogeneity, it is difficult to identify the determinants of 
backward linkages accurately. 
 
=== Figure 1 === 
 
Second, the previous studies did not address the dynamic aspects of local 
procurements. The expansion of local procurements takes time to bear fruit. Table 2 
presents simple regression results of the local procurement ratio on the experience of 
affiliates, generated by a fixed-effect model for 1994-2000. The definition of the local 
procurement ratio is the same as Figure 1 while experience is defined as the length of 
operation (the year of the survey minus the year of establishment). 
 
=== Table 2 === 
 
Table 2 indicates that the local procurement ratio increases with the affiliate’s 
experience, especially in the electric machinery and transportation equipment sectors. 
We observe positive coefficients on experience in all industries, and they are significant 
in manufacturing, electric machinery, and transportation equipment. These results imply 
that the dynamic aspect should be considered for the analysis of the backward linkages 
of multinationals. 
In examining the determinants of local procurements of Japanese foreign 
affiliates, our paper makes two contributions. First is our focus on the dynamic aspects 
of local procurements. We control for various factors, including host country 
characteristics, parent firm characteristics, and unobservable affiliate heterogeneity. 
                                                        
8  Total costs are defined as the sum of intermediate input purchases, wage payments, interest 
payment, rental expenses, and depreciation. 
10  For a discussion of the price elasticities for the translog cost function, see Berndt (1991, Chapter 
9).   4
Second, in order to control for affiliate-level heterogeneity and to trace the changes in 
the vertical linkages at the affiliate level, we have developed an affiliate-level panel 
database, using the confidential survey by the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and 
Industry (METI). The data set covers more than 1,800 manufacturing affiliates from 
1994 to 2000. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. The next section explains the 
estimation model and data. The third section discusses the estimation results, while the 
fourth section addresses the implications of the empirical results in more detail. A 
summary of our findings and policy implications are presented in the final section. 
 
2.  Research Design 
2.1.  The Model 
Denote the cost function of a foreign affiliate i  in industry  j  located in 
country  c by  ) , ( ijc ijc ijc y C p , where  ijc y  represents gross output of the affiliate and 
ijc p  is a vector of factor prices. The output is produced by a set of inputs  n ) ( N n∈ . 
The second-order Taylor’s series approximation in logarithms to the cost function is: 
, ln ln ) (ln
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Suppose that affiliate i  produces  ijc y , using four inputs: K  (capital stock),  L 
(labor),  D (intermediate inputs from host country  c), and  M  (intermediate inputs 
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ijc ∈  represents the price of input  n. The higher the value of 
D
ijc s , the more the affiliate uses host country’s intermediate inputs, implying that local 
procurements are high. Adding other control variables  ijc Z   and an error term 
D
ijc µ , the 
regression equation is specified as follows: 
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where  D α β ln 0 = . 
Once we estimate equation (4), we can discuss the relationship between local 
intermediate inputs and other factors by calculating cross- and own-price elasticities of 
factor demand.
10 The Allen partial cross-price elasticity between local procurements 
D  and other factors  n  is represented as: 
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where  Dn β  is a parameter to be estimated. 
D s  and 
n s  are the mean cost shares of 
the regression sample for inputs D  and n , respectively. Similarly, the own-price 
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If 0 < Dn σ , local intermediate inputs and factor  n are complements. If, on the other 
hand, 0 > Dn σ , local intermediate inputs and factor  n are  substitutes. 
 
2.2.  Data 
Source 
We use the micro database of Kaigai Jigyou Katsudou Kihon (Doukou) Chousa 
(The Survey on Overseas Business Activities, hereafter the METI survey) prepared by 
the Research and Statistics Department, METI (1996-2002a). The METI survey is 
conducted annually by a questionnaire based on self-declaration survey forms (one for 
parent firm and one for each foreign affiliate) given to the parent firm. 
The main purpose of the METI survey is to obtain basic information on the   6
activities of foreign affiliates of Japanese firms. The METI survey covers all Japanese 
firms that had affiliates abroad (hereinafter referred to as parent firm) as of the end of 
the fiscal year (March 31).
11  A foreign affiliate of a Japanese firm is defined as the firm 
that is located in a foreign country in which a Japanese firm had more than or equal to a 
10 percent equity share. Industrial classification is available at the 2-digit level. The 
limitation of the survey is the lack of information on some financial variables such as 
tangible assets and institutional features such as keiretsu. 
From this annual cross-section survey, we developed a longitudinal (panel) data 
set for foreign affiliates in manufacturing from 1994 to 2000. Each affiliate is traced 
throughout the period using the name of the firm as a key.
12 Further, to control for 
parent-firm characteristics, we merged the METI survey with the Kigyou Katsudou 
Kihon Chousa Houkokusho ( The Results of the Basic Survey of Japanese Business 
Structure and Activities) by the METI (1996-2002b).
13 We omit from our sample set 
firms that did not provide information on local procurements. The number of foreign 
affiliates exceeds 1,000 for each year. The lists of countries and industries are presented 
in Tables A1 and A2. 
 
Cost share of local inputs: 
D
ijc s  
The cost share of local inputs for our statistical analysis is defined as local 
intermediate inputs divided by total costs.
14 Total costs are defined as the sum of 
intermediate input purchases, wage payments, interest payment, rental expenses, and 
depreciation. 
 
                                                        
11  Some industries such as financial and insurance and real estate are not covered in the survey. 
12  There are some affiliates that changed their name during our sample period. In this case, we also 
use industry, location, scale, and the information on parent firm to trace the affiliates. For detailed 
information on the construction of the panel data, see Matsuura (2005). 
13  This survey was first conducted in the 1991, then in the 1994, and annually afterwards. The main 
purpose of the survey is to statistically capture the overall picture of Japanese corporate firms in light 
of their activity diversification, globalization, and strategies on R&D and information technology. 
The survey is made on all firms with more than 50 employees and with more than capital of 30 
million yen, covering both manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms. Our sample is thus limited 
to those firms. The limitation of this survey is the lack of information on some financial information. 
For more detail information on The Results of the Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure and 
Activities, see for instance Nishimura, Nakajima, and Kiyota (2005) and Kimura and Kiyota (2005). 
14  Local inputs may include inputs from Japanese foreign affiliates located in that country. Although 
the data cannot identify the ratio of inputs from the Japanese foreign affiliates, we try to control for 
some of these effects, adding Japanese network effects as other control variable. For more details, 









ijc p p p p , , ,  
The input price of labor 
L
ijc p  is defined as annual average wages. Since it is 
difficult to obtain average wages at the firm level, we use the industry average wage of 
foreign affiliates by country. This in turn implies that 
L
ijc p  is collapsed into 
L
jct p . The 
data are obtained from the METI survey. 
Another task is to obtain price data for capital and domestic intermediate inputs. 
Suppose that the prices of capital and domestic intermediate inputs are firm specific but 
unobservable and fixed across time.
15 This implies that these prices are represented as 





ijct DK p p ω β β = + ln ln .                                       ( 7 )  
Since a large part of intermediate inputs is traded within the same firm located in 
different countries (intra-firm trade), we assume that the imported inputs of each 
affiliate come from the same industry in Japan. This assumption can be justified because 
the share of imported inputs from Japan in total imported inputs is quite high.
16 
Following Hanson, Mataloni, and Slaughter (2005), 
M
ijc p   can be expressed as: 




jct g p p + + + = τ                                    ( 8 )  
where 
M
jt p  is the input price index of intermediates in industry  j ,  ct τ  is the ad 
valorem tariff rate that country  c  levies on imports, and  ct g  is  the  ad valorem freight 
rate on imports from Japan to country  c. 
For 
M
jt p , we use the sectoral input price index of manufacturing industry in 
Japan, which comes from the Bank of Japan website (2004). To control for the effects of 
exchange rate movements, we multiply the sectoral input price index by the nominal 
exchange rate index (1989 = 1) obtained from IMF (2004). The tariff rate is defined as 
                                                        
15  A concern is the change of prices through the period. This can be captured by the year dummies. 
However, the fixed-effect model does not allow us to include year dummies and “experience” 
simultaneously. For more detail, see Wooldridge (2003). Because of the data limitations on these 
factor prices, it is not possible to estimate the system of equations and to impose cross-equation 
parameter restrictions (i.e., the symmetry of cross-price derivatives). 
16  For the period of our study the average share for all foreign affiliates was as high as 65.8 percent.   8
tariff revenues divided by imports. Both tariff revenues and imports are obtained from 
World Bank (2004). The freight rate is defined as the C.I.F. value of imports divided by 
the F.O.B. value of imports obtained from IMF (2004). 
 
Output:  ijc y  
Output is defined as sales of a foreign affiliate. To obtain real output, sales are 
deflated by each country’s GDP deflator. The data are taken from the METI survey. 
 
Other control variables:  ijc Z  
Six additional variables are used as control variables and tested for their impacts 
on the use of local inputs. The six variables can be grouped into two sets. One set 
concerns the characteristics of foreign affiliates and parent firms in Japan, and the other 
the conditions of the host country or host market. For the variables in the first group, we 
used the length of operation ( ijct EXPER ), the share of equity of the foreign affiliates 
held by the parent firm ( ijct SHARE ), the share of local sales in total sales 
( ijct LOCSALES ), and the research and development (R&D) activities of the parent firm 
( ijct D R & ). For the variables in the second group, we used the value-added of the 
manufacturing sector ( ct SUPPLIERS ) and the presence of foreign affiliates of Japanese 
multinationals ( jct JSUPPLIERS ). The data for R&D activities of parent firm are taken 
from The Results of the Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities by 
the METI (1996-2002b) and other variables are from the METI survey. 
The length of operation,  ijct EXPER , is included to examine its impacts on the 
local procurement ratio. As already explained, this is our most important variable. 
Foreign affiliates of multinationals without much knowledge about local firms have to 
rely on their parent firm or affiliates for the supply of intermediate inputs in the early 
stages of their operation. As foreign affiliates increase their knowledge about local 
supply of inputs, they are likely to increase local inputs. At least two factors may 
contribute here. One is the expectation or request from the host country to increase local   9
inputs. A host country government may realize the importance of increasing local 
linkages with affiliates in order to promote technology transfer and to develop 
supporting industries. Accordingly, the government that is keen on gaining maximum 
benefits from hosting foreign affiliates of multinationals requests foreign affiliates to 
increase local inputs. 
The other factor that would lead to increased local inputs is the behavior of 
foreign affiliates in reducing various risks resulting from international transactions. 
Reliance on imported inputs would place the foreign affiliates in a vulnerable position 
as international transactions are subject to uncertainties associated with exchange rate 
changes, transportation, communication, and other factors. We would therefore expect 
ijct EXPER   to have a positive impact on the share of local inputs in total inputs. 
The share of equity of the foreign affiliates held by the parent firm, ijct SHARE , is 
expected to have a negative impact on local procurement. Foreign affiliates under tight 
control of the parent firm tend to rely heavily on the parent firm for procurement of 
inputs, output sales, personnel, and other factors. Indeed, the parent firm has an 
incentive to increase supply or sales of inputs to its subsidiaries in order to maintain its 
business at home. 
The share of local sales in total sales of foreign affiliates,  ijct LOCSALES , is 
included to capture the importance of local market orientation for the determination of 
input sources. We hypothesize that greater local sales orientation leads to higher reliance 
on local inputs. Two factors may be considered here. First, foreign affiliates of Japanese 
multinationals with high local sales orientation are likely to have strong linkage with 
local firms not only in terms of sales but also in terms of procurement of inputs. Second, 
foreign affiliates engaged in the production of products for the local market rely on local 
inputs because such production tends to require local inputs. 
We focus on the R&D activities of the parent firm  ijct D R &  to control for the 
effects of the parent firm in Japan. As Belderbos, Capannelli, and Fukao (2001) noted, 
R&D-intensive firms are more likely to possess firm-specific intangible assets than the 
less R&D-intensive firms, implying that the transaction between a foreign affiliate and 
local firms tends to be high compared with the transaction between a foreign affiliate 
and its parent firm because of transaction costs, imperfect information, and incomplete 
contracts. We thus expect that R&D-intensive firms are likely to import intermediate   10
inputs from Japan while less R&D-intensive firms are likely to use local inputs.   
Turning to host country factors, we include the value-added of manufacturing 
( ct SUPPLIERS ) to capture the availability of inputs from the host country. We expect 
ct SUPPLIERS  to have a positive impact on local inputs, since a large manufacturing 
sector indicates the presence of potential input suppliers. The data are taken from World 
Bank (2004). 
A limitation of our data is that local procurements may include the procurements 
from foreign affiliates of other Japanese firms in the same country. Japanese firms are 
argued to have established exclusive network with other Japanese firms in procurement 
of inputs as well as sales of outputs. In order to control for such “Japanese network” 
effects in the procurement of inputs, we include the presence of foreign affiliates of 
Japanese firms ( jct JSUPPLIERS ), which is measured by the number of foreign affiliates 
of Japanese multinationals in the same industry and in the same country under study. 
The significantly positive coefficients are expected if “Japanese network” has strong 
effects on the local procurements. The data are obtained from Matsuura (2005). 
Another important set of control variables is related to policy effects such as 
local content requirements and the restriction on equity participation. However, in our 
data set, these variables are available only for 1995 and 1998, implying that the 
inclusion of the policy effects makes it difficult to conduct panel data analysis. We thus 
exclude the policy effects from the baseline regression and address this issue in the 
extended model in Section 4.1. 
In sum, the regression equation is specified as follows: 
.           
&           
ln   ln ln
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ijct jct ct









D R LOCSALES SHARE EXPER
y p p s
µ γ γ
γ γ γ γ
β β β ω
+ + +
+ + + +
+ + + =
        ( 9 )  
The definitions of the variables and expected sign of coefficients are summarized in 
Table A3, while summary statistics and the correlation matrix for these variables are 
presented in Tables A4 and A5. 
 
3.  Results 
Table 3 shows the regression results of equation (9) generated by a fixed-effect   11
model.
17   First, in manufacturing, the coefficients of  ijc y ln ,  ijct LOCSALES , 
jct JSUPPLIERS , and  ct SUPPLIERS   indicate positive and statistically significant signs 
while the coefficients of 
M
jct p  and  ijct D R &  are negative and significant. The results 
imply that local procurements will be high for affiliates with a high local sales 
orientation. Parent firm characteristics can also be an important factor for the patterns of 
local procurements. As expected, the parent with high R&D-intensity is less likely to 
use local inputs. 
The conditions of the host country are also important. Local procurements will 
be high in a country where the presence of Japanese foreign affiliates is high and where 
there is a large manufacturing sector. These results suggest the importance of the 
supporting industry. 
 
=== Table 3 === 
 
Second, however, these effects are slightly different among industries. For 
instance, the coefficients of  jct JSUPPLIERS  are significantly positive only in the 
electric machinery while those of  ct SUPPLIERS  are significantly positive only in 
transportation equipment industries. On the other hand, the coefficients of 
ijct LOCSALES   indicate positive and significant signs in manufacturing, textiles, general 
machinery, electric machinery, and transportation equipment. The results suggest that 
there are some differences in the determinants of local procurements among industries. 
Finally, the coefficients of  ijct EXPER   do not show significantly positive. These 
results indicate that the experiences do not have a positive impact on local procurements. 
However, the effect of experiences might be different across regions in which foreign 
affiliates are located. In order to investigate the regional differences in the effects of 
experiences, we include a cross-term between  ijct EXPER  and a regional dummy. Our 
                                                        
17  Although the dependent variable takes the value between zero and one, we employ a linear model 
rather than a Tobit model. This is because the presence of the affiliate-level fixed-effect for fixed 
time periods makes it difficult to use a Tobit model. For more detail, see Baltagi (2001, p.212).   12
hypothesis is that experience is likely to have different impacts on local procurements in 
different regions. This is because of regional differences in acquiring capability for 
supplying inputs to foreign affiliates, reflecting the differences in the speed of the 
formation of supporting industries. 
Table 4 presents the regression results with the cross-term involving experience 
and regional dummies. We include five regional dummies: ASEAN, China, NIES, 
Europe, and Others Countries.
18 “Other Countries” include all other countries except 
the United States. Therefore, the coefficients present the difference between the United 
States and each region. Once we include the cross-term, the R-squared improves. 
Further, the positive and statistically significant effects emerged. In manufacturing, the 
positive and significant effects are observed in ASEAN, China, NIES, Europe, and other 
countries. For ASEAN, China, and NIES, significantly positive effects are observed for 
several industries. For ASEAN, the experience has positive effects on local 
procurements in electric machinery. For China, the significantly positive effects are 
confirmed in textiles, electric machinery, and transportation equipment industries. For 
NIES, significant effects exist in general machinery sector. 
We also find the positive coefficients for Europe and Other Countries. However, 
the coefficients of these regions (0.007) are relatively small. Thus the sum of these 
coefficients and the coefficient of the United States (-0.007) become zero. This in turn 
implies that the experience does not have any effects in Europe and Other Countries. 
 
=== Table 4 === 
 
Table 4 also presents the Allen partial cross-price elasticities between imported 
and local intermediate inputs. Positive elasticities mean that the imported and local 
intermediate inputs are substitutes, while negative elasticities indicate that they are 
complements. The results indicate that imported and local intermediate inputs are 
substitutes in the textiles, general machinery, and electric machinery sectors while they 
are complements in the transportation equipment industry. 
The results imply that FDI in textiles, general machinery, and electric machinery 
is likely to be horizontal: the same horizontal stage of a production process of a product 
is duplicated in home and host countries. On the other hand, FDI in the transportation 
                                                        
18  In this paper, ASEAN includes Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. NIES includes 
Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. Europe includes Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Other Countries include all other countries except the 
United States. List of countries are presented in Table A2.   13
equipment industry tends to be vertical: a part of the production process of a product is 
separated and relocated into a different country.
19 The results also imply that the 
expansion of local procurements by Japanese transportation equipment firms will help 
increase the imports from Japan.
20 
In sum, the results suggest that the dynamic aspect of local procurements is 
important in analyzing the vertical backward linkages of multinationals. Table 2 
indicates the positive correlation between the local procurements and the experience, or 
the length of operation. In Table 4, we confirm that the experience has significantly 
positive effects in some industries in East and Southeast Asian countries, especially 
China, even after we control for various factors. These results indicate that foreign 
affiliates of Japanese multinationals in some East and Southeast Asian countries develop 
local backward linkages over time, as they accumulate experience in local operation. 
The fact that this phenomenon is observed mainly in developing countries and 
not in developed countries may be attributable to several factors. One is the difference 
in the speed of formation of supporting industries, or local input suppliers, in these two 
types of countries. Rapidly expanding supporting industries in East and Southeast Asia 
enable the foreign affiliates of Japanese firms in these countries to increase local 
procurements. By contrast, in developed countries supporting industries are already well 
established by the time Japanese firms set up their affiliates and thus there is only 
limited opportunity for affiliates to increase local procurements over time. 
Another reason may be the closed nature of the procurement network in East and 
Southeast Asia compared with the situation in developed countries. Similar to the case 
in Japan, business practices are rather closed in East and Southeast Asia, as firms in 
these counties pursue a long-term relationship based on trust. As such, it takes time for 
Japanese foreign affiliates to establish business relationships with local firms in these 
countries. 
 
4.  Discussion 
4.1.  Additional Control Variables 
In our baseline regression, we did not examine the effects of government policy 
because of a lack of data availability. However, host country FDI policies have 
                                                        
19  “VFDI (vertical FDI) generally complements domestic activities, whereas HFDI (horizontal FDI) 
sometimes substitutes for them” (Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004, p,44). 
20  Based on the fact that many Japanese multinationals are located in East and Southeast Asian 
countries, the results are not surprising. Indeed, “VFDI is expected to take place especially between 
countries with different factor endowments and factor costs” (Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004, 
p,44).   14
important impacts on the behavior of foreign affiliates. Among various policy measures, 
local content requirements, which are imposed on the foreign affiliates as a condition 
for the approval of FDI, can have a significant impact on local procurement of inputs. 
Although the use of local procurement requirements became prohibited under the 
TRIMs agreement in the WTO in 1995, some developing countries continued to use 
local content requirements as they were permitted the postponement of the application 
of the TRIMs agreement.
21 
To test the impact of local content requirements, we include  ijct LCR , expecting 
it to have a positive impact on the local procurement ratio. In the absence of accurate 
information on the status of the local procurement requirements, we use the information 
obtained from the METI survey. We regard the presence of such regulation in a country 
when a foreign affiliate in question responds positively to the question asking if it faces 
such regulation. Admittedly this indicator is somewhat subjective and thus subject to 
inaccuracy. 
Another important policy that the host government applies to a foreign firm is 
restriction on equity participation. Many countries would like to maintain control of 
foreign firms on their affiliates at low levels, as they are concerned with the dominant 
position of foreign firms in their local markets. Thus several countries have regulation 
on foreign ownership. Recognizing not only the importance of the type of ownership on 
management practices such as input procurement but also the importance of government 
regulation on the type of entry, we include the method of entry ( ijct ENTRYMODE ) as a 
variable in the estimation. We classify the method of entry into four types: 1) greenfield 
investment (100 percent equity ownership) ( ijct ENTRYMODE1 ); 2) joint venture (less 
than 100 percent equity ownership) ( ijct ENTRYMODE2 ); 3) takeover (acquisition of 
existing firm, or majority investment of existing firm) ( ijct ENTRYMODE3 ); and 4) 
capital participation (minority investment of existing firm) ( ijct ENTRYMODE4 ). 
Following the discussions above about the extent of the relationship with the parent firm 
and procurement of local inputs, we hypothesize that the local procurement share is 
                                                        
21  On the application of the TRIMs agreement, see, for instance, METI (2004).   15
lowest for greenfield investment, followed by joint venture, takeover, and capital 
participation, in that order. 
Since information on these additional variables for FDI policy of the host 
government,  ijct LCR  and  ijct ENTRYMODE , is available only for 1995 and 1998 in the 
METI survey, we conducted cross-section regressions for these two years, and the 
results are shown in Table 5. The estimated coefficients on  ijct LCR  are unexpectedly 
negative but not statistically significant. This unexpected sign may be due to the reverse 
causality in that a country with a low local procurement ratio is likely to impose local 
procurement requirement, leading to the negative relationship observed in our 
estimation. It should be noted that the measurement of this variable needs to be 
improved as discussed earlier. 
 
=== Table 5 === 
 
  The results on the entry modes show that the weak influence of parent firm on 
the management of its affiliate would result in high local inputs. This result is consistent 
with the earlier finding on the impacts of equity-share participation on local input 
procurements. What is interesting and new about the result here is the high level of local 
input procurements for the case of M&As. This is not surprising because the foreign 
affiliates established through M&As had already developed local backward linkages 
before being acquired or merged by Japanese firms. 
 
4.2.  Short-run Cost Function 
The substitution between imported and local intermediate inputs is much easier 
than other factors. Needless to say, capital stock such as plants and machines for 
production is a fixed factor for a short time period. But labor can also be regarded as a 
fixed factor. The foreign affiliates of Japanese multinationals face several problems in 
labor relations in developing countries, which makes it difficult for the affiliates to 
dismiss or layoff workers in the short term. In other words, capital and labor can be 
fixed factors in the short run.
22 Incorporating this assumption, we estimate the 
following short run cost function, regarding labor and capital as fixed factors: 
                                                        
22  Some studies in labor economics show that labor can be a quasi-fixed factor. See, for instance, Oi 
(1962).   16
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The left hand side variable,  ijct E LINPUTSHAR , is now the ratio of local inputs to total 
intermediate inputs (imported plus local inputs). On the right hand side, labor (fixed 
factor,  ijct L ln ) is included while the price of labor (wage) is excluded. Labor data come 
from the METI survey. Regional dummies are 
R
ict D , where 
} , , , , { Others EU CHINA ASEAN NIES R∈ . The remaining variables are the same as the 
variables used in equation (9). Since capital stock is not available in our dataset, we 
assume that fixed effects and time variations capture the unobservable capital stock 
effects. 
Table 6 presents the regression results of equation (10). As expected, experience 
has positive effects on local procurements. However, the results are slightly different 
from the results obtained from the baseline regression in Table 4. The coefficients of 
ijct EXPER  indicate positive and significant signs in the transportation equipment 
industry. Since the cross-term captures the gap between the United States and other 
regions, the result implies that the significantly positive effects of experience on local 
procurements are observed for all other regions. Further, in the general machinery 
industry, the positive effects are observed in China and NIES. In the textiles and electric 
machinery in China, experience has strong impacts on local procurements. 
 
=== Table 6 === 
 
 
4.3.  Trade Costs 
In our baseline regression, imported input 
M
ijc p  consists of an input-price index 
and trade costs (tariff and freight rates), and we do not distinguish transportation costs 
with the input-price index. As Hanson, Mataloni, and Slaughter (2005) have argued, the 
investigation of the effects of trade costs can provide useful insight for the international   17
vertical linkage of multinationals. We therefore decompose imported input 
M
ijct p ln  into 
import price 
M
jt p ln  and trade costs  ) 1 ln( ct ct g + +τ  and re-estimate the baseline 
model. We expect that local procurements increase when trade costs are high and 
therefore the coefficients of trade costs are expected to be positive 
Table 7 indicates the estimation results. The coefficients of trade costs indicate 
expected positive signs in general machinery, electric machinery, and transportation 
equipment although statistical significance is observed only in general machinery. This 
result implies that the high trade costs increase local procurements, which is consistent 
with the findings by Hanson, Mataloni, and Slaughter (2005). However, the effect might 
not be very strong. 
 
=== Table 7 === 
 
4.4.  Difference between Developed and Developing Countries 
In the baseline model, we assume that the cost structure of Japanese affiliates is 
different across industries but the same across regions. However, the cost structure may 
possibly be different between developed and developing countries. We thus estimate the 
cost function differently between developed and developing countries.
23 
 
=== Table 8 === 
 
Table 8 presents the regression results that have two messages. First, the positive 
effects of experience are observed even when we control for the difference of cost 
structures between developed and developing countries. In developed countries, positive 
coefficients are observed in textiles and transportation equipment, and significantly 
positive in transportation equipment. On the other hand, in developing countries, 
positive coefficients are confirmed in general machinery, electric machinery, and 
transportation equipment and significantly positive in electric machinery. This result 
implies that the positive impacts of experience are relatively robust. 
Second, there is a similarity in the relationship between local and imported 
                                                        
23  Developed countries include Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States while developing countries consist 
of Argentina, China, Hong Kong, Korea, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam.   18
inputs between developed and developing countries. The elasticity of substitution 
indicates that local and imported intermediates are complements in textiles and 
transportation equipment while they are substitutes in general machinery and electric 
machinery both in developed and developing countries. Our results thus imply that the 
relationship between local procurements and imports are largely attributed to industry 
factors rather than country factors. 
 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
This paper has examined the determinants of backward vertical linkages of 
Japanese foreign affiliates in manufacturing for the period 1994-2000. In analyzing 
these linkages, we have focused on local procurements. One of the unique features of 
our analysis is the use of panel data, which enabled us to examine the dynamic aspects 
of local procurements over time. We found that characteristics of the affiliates as well as 
host countries have important impacts on local procurements. Local procurements are 
high for the affiliates with strong local sales. 
One of the most interesting findings is the importance of experience of the 
affiliate, which is measured by the length of operation. The experience has positive 
impacts on local procurements in the affiliates in East and Southeast Asian countries 
especially China, but not for the affiliates in developed countries. This result is robust 
even after we control for various factors, including government regulation on local 
procurements and agglomeration effects. We interpret these results to reflect the 
existence of “vintage” effects in East and Southeast Asian countries. Earlier established 
affiliates showed significantly higher procurement levels in these countries. 
This finding has important policy implications. Host governments wishing to 
increase local procurements should develop an attractive and stable FDI environment. 
Unless foreign firms stay long enough, a host country cannot expect foreign firms to 
develop local linkages. It is well known that countries with a stable macroeconomic 
environment, well-developed infrastructure, including not only hard infrastructure such 
as transportation and communication facilities but also soft infrastructure such as law 
and order, education system, bureaucracy, and open trade and FDI regimes, can attract 
foreign firms and host them for a long time. 
Another important policy implication is the possible ineffectiveness of local 
content requirements on increasing local procurements. This follows from the negative 
effect of local content requirements on local procurements, although the effect was not 
statistically significant. The issue of local content regulation has to be probed further, as 
it is one of the most contentious policy issues between developed and developing   19
countries. Developing countries keen on developing their own supporting industries 
argue for the need of local content requirements, while developed countries interested in 
securing a freer investment environment argue in favor of removing such restriction. 
Although the effectiveness of local content requirements has to be further probed, it 
should be made clear that such regulation discourages FDI. Given this observation, the 
application of local content requirement cannot be recommended to developing 
countries. 
Before closing this study, we point out several research issues for the future, 
which were not analyzed in this study. First, the further investigation on the experience 
effect is an important extension. For instance, the experience might have a non-linear 
effect on the local procurements. Also, it is interesting to ask the cause of the experience 
effect: learning by each firm or growing networks? Second, an analysis of the 
comparison of local procurement between firms from different origins is of interest. 
Japanese firms and their affiliates are often argued to trade with their keiretsu firms 
and/or other Japanese firms, thereby resulting in limited procurement from local firms. 
Such an assertion has to be examined by comparing the behavior of Japanese foreign 
affiliates with those from other countries. 
Third, an in-depth study on the relationship between international and local 
backward linkages is warranted. Trade costs might have different effects across sectors. 
The construction of industry-level trade policy variables through time and across sectors 
enables us to examine such differences. Finally, the welfare effect of local procurements 
is an important question for home as well as host countries.
24 How does the shift from 
imported to local inputs affect home and host countries. Do both home and host 
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1991-1995 1996-2000 1991-1995 1996-2000
World Total intermediate inputs 75,873 98,428 100.0 129.7 100.0 100.0
Imported inputs 45,161 57,164 100.0 126.6 59.5 58.1
Local inputs 30,712 41,264 100.0 134.4 40.5 41.9
United States Total intermediate inputs 29,841 40,046 100.0 134.2 100.0 100.0
Imported inputs 14,569 16,991 100.0 116.6 48.8 42.4
Local inputs 15,272 23,055 100.0 151.0 51.2 57.6
Europe Total intermediate inputs 3,042 4,389 100.0 144.3 100.0 100.0
Imported inputs 2,598 3,319 100.0 127.8 85.4 75.6
Local inputs 444 1,070 100.0 240.9 14.6 24.4
NIES Total intermediate inputs 11,220 17,733 100.0 158.0 100.0 100.0
Imported inputs 7,918 11,177 100.0 141.2 70.6 63.0
Local inputs 3,302 6,556 100.0 198.5 29.4 37.0
ASEAN Total intermediate inputs 4,731 7,879 100.0 166.5 100.0 100.0
Imported inputs 2,540 3,903 100.0 153.7 53.7 49.5
Local inputs 2,191 3,975 100.0 181.4 46.3 50.5
China Total intermediate inputs 379 2,069 100.0 545.9 100.0 100.0
Imported inputs 250 1,159 100.0 464.2 65.9 56.0
Local inputs 129 910 100.0 703.8 34.1 44.0Table 2. Relationship between Local Procurements and Experience








EXPER 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.006 0.007
[4.73]*** [1.43] [1.36] [4.17]*** [3.41]***
Constant 0.335 0.318 0.319 0.234 0.333
[38.80]*** [8.84]*** [13.11]*** [14.87]*** [17.16]***
N 21117 1555 2397 5547 3068
Number of affiliates 6366 465 667 1606 926
R
2 (within) 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.005
Notes:
Source: The METI Survey
1) Fixed-effect model is used for estimation.
2) ***, **, * indicates the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively
3) Figures in brackets indicate t-statistics.
4) EXPER (Experience) is defined as the length of operation (the year of survey minus the year
of establishment).Table 3.  Estimation Resutls of Cost Function
Dependent variable: local procurements (local inputs / total costs)







lnPL 0.003 -0.002 0.007 -0.013 -0.003 -0.018
[0.56] [-0.44] [0.29] [-0.88] [-0.30] [-1.27]
lnY 0.030 0.029 0.013 0.039 0.016 0.030
[11.91]*** [11.70]*** [1.34] [5.07]*** [3.65]*** [5.95]***
lnPM -0.017 -0.027 -0.071 0.007 -0.005 -0.088
[-1.67]* [-2.19]** [-1.90]* [0.17] [-0.20] [-2.93]***
SUPPLIERS 0.044 0.067 0.025 0.051 0.118
[2.46]** [1.05] [0.48] [1.56] [2.25]**
JSUPPLIERS 0.033 -0.059 -0.057 0.124 0.052
[2.08]** [-0.88] [-1.16] [4.81]*** [1.33]
LOCSALES 0.126 0.169 0.092 0.147 0.105
[14.37]*** [3.84]*** [3.91]*** [10.09]*** [4.54]***
SHARE -0.018 -0.023 -0.029 0.017 -0.052
[-1.37] [-0.39] [-0.93] [0.58] [-1.47]
R&D -0.184 -0.367 0.010 -0.021 0.124
[-1.67]* [-0.21] [0.02] [-0.10] [0.48]
EXPER 0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.004 0.000
[0.90] [-0.42] [-0.05] [-0.46] [1.33] [-0.13]
Constant 0.159 -1.225 -1.323 -0.439 -1.798 -3.316
[8.03]*** [-2.64]*** [-0.78] [-0.32] [-2.12]** [-2.42]**
N 21117 21117 1555 2397 5547 3068
Number of affiliates 6366 6366 465 667 1606 926
R
2 (within) 0.011 0.026 0.023 0.025 0.042 0.041
Notes:
Source: The METI Survey
1) Fixed-effectmodel is used for estimation.
2) ***, **, * indicates the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively
3) Figures in brackets indicate t-statistics.
4) For the definition of variables, see main text and Table A3.Table 4.  Estimation Resutls of Cost Function with Regional Dummies








lnPL -0.003 -0.001 -0.012 0.000 -0.018
[-0.53] [-0.05] [-0.77] [-0.01] [-1.31]
lnY 0.027 0.004 0.036 0.010 0.029
[10.69]*** [0.41] [4.56]*** [2.20]** [5.64]***
lnPM -0.028 0.029 -0.009 0.033 -0.090
[-2.16]** [0.71] [-0.19] [1.14] [-2.82]***
SUPPLIERS 0.008 -0.013 -0.001 -0.001 0.095
[0.40] [-0.19] [-0.01] [-0.02] [1.66]*
JSUPPLIERS 0.023 0.020 -0.071 0.099 0.048
[1.39] [0.28] [-1.31] [3.72]*** [1.11]
LOCSALES 0.124 0.137 0.090 0.143 0.105
[14.19]*** [3.15]*** [3.80]*** [9.82]*** [4.53]***
SHARE -0.018 -0.029 -0.027 0.024 -0.054
[-1.31] [-0.50] [-0.87] [0.83] [-1.51]
R&D -0.162 0.141 0.038 0.034 0.159
[-1.47] [0.08] [0.08] [0.16] [0.61]
EXPER -0.007 0.007 -0.008 -0.004 -0.001
[-3.65]*** [0.40] [-1.53] [-1.06] [-0.15]
EXPER × ASEAN dummy 0.014 -0.021 0.012 0.011 0.006
[4.86]*** [-1.12] [1.29] [2.00]** [0.97]
EXPER × China dummy 0.020 0.028 0.014 0.035 0.016
[6.55]*** [1.66]* [1.45] [5.80]*** [1.80]*
EXPER × NIES dummy 0.009 -0.027 0.013 0.007 -0.002
[3.52]*** [-1.47] [2.01]** [1.48] [-0.33]
EXPER × Europe dummy 0.007 -0.018 0.005 0.011 -0.001
[2.59]*** [-0.93] [0.74] [2.00]** [-0.12]
EXPER × Other Countries dummy 0.007 -0.012 0.011 0.002 -0.002
[1.90]* [-0.65] [1.27] [0.22] [-0.30]
Constant -0.180 0.585 0.342 -0.289 -2.652
[-0.34] [0.33] [0.23] [-0.28] [-1.76]*
N 21117 1555 2397 5547 3068
Number of affiliates 6366 465 667 1606 926
R
2 (within) 0.029 0.063 0.028 0.051 0.044
Elasticity of substitution -0.429 2.082 0.528 2.986 -3.660
Notes: 1) Elasticity of substitution between imported and local inputs is obtained from the estimated coefficients.
2) For other notes and sources, see Table 3.Table 5.  Estimation Resutls of Cost Function with Additional Control Variables
              Dependent variable: local procurements (local inputs / total costs)




















EXPER × ASEAN dummy -0.002 0.001
[-0.91] [0.64]
EXPER × China dummy -0.004 -0.005
[-0.65] [-1.45]
EXPER × NIES dummy -0.001 -0.001
[-0.86] [-0.41]
EXPER × Europe dummy -0.008 -0.002
[-3.55]*** [-0.99]

















For notes and sources, see Table 3.Table 6.  Estimation Results of Short-run Cost Function








lnPM -0.009 0.041 0.023 0.036 -0.051
[-0.59] [0.86] [0.43] [1.13] [-1.37]
lnL 0.022 -0.004 0.037 0.015 0.021
[4.32]*** [-0.16] [2.22]** [1.90]* [1.64]
lnY 0.002 -0.029 0.000 -0.004 0.004
[0.65] [-2.34]** [-0.01] [-0.70] [0.55]
SUPPLIERS -0.022 -0.001 -0.027 -0.018 0.034
[-1.00] [-0.02] [-0.45] [-0.42] [0.52]
JSUPPLIERS 0.024 0.003 -0.117 0.122 0.064
[1.28] [0.03] [-1.92]* [4.10]*** [1.27]
LOCSALES 0.150 0.114 0.123 0.173 0.121
[15.23]*** [2.22]** [4.60]*** [10.71]*** [4.47]***
SHARE -0.014 -0.057 -0.014 0.039 -0.053
[-0.91] [-0.84] [-0.39] [1.23] [-1.26]
R&D -0.062 -1.612 -0.260 0.027 0.522
[-0.50] [-0.80] [-0.47] [0.11] [1.71]*
EXPER 0.003 0.009 -0.004 0.006 0.011
[1.33] [0.44] [-0.69] [1.24] [2.08]**
EXPER × ASEAN dummy 0.012 -0.022 0.017 0.010 -0.001
[3.82]*** [-1.03] [1.63] [1.63] [-0.08]
EXPER × China dummy 0.027 0.052 0.027 0.033 0.028
[8.00]*** [2.62]*** [2.50]** [4.89]*** [2.71]***
EXPER × NIES dummy 0.005 -0.028 0.015 0.003 0.000
[1.79]* [-1.33] [2.13]** [0.51] [0.02]
EXPER × Europe dummy 0.001 -0.025 0.007 0.001 0.000
[0.46] [-1.08] [0.92] [0.17] [0.01]
EXPER × Other Countries dummy 0.004 -0.013 0.010 -0.003 -0.006
[1.04] [-0.59] [1.04] [-0.38] [-0.62]
Constant 0.690 0.682 1.325 0.094 -0.983
[1.19] [0.34] [0.83] [0.08] [-0.58]
N 20913 1538 2368 5514 3057
Number of affiliates 6315 461 664 1595 921
R
2 (within) 0.033 0.097 0.032 0.059 0.041
For notes and sources, see Table 3.Table 7.  Estimation Resutls of Cost Function with Regional Dummies: Trade Costs








lnPL -0.002 0.001 -0.010 0.000 -0.023
[-0.49] [0.06] [-0.63] [-0.03] [-1.61]
lnY 0.027 0.004 0.035 0.011 0.029
[10.73]*** [0.41] [4.40]*** [2.30]** [5.71]***
lnP'M -0.028 0.028 -0.047 0.005 -0.068
[-3.04]*** [0.93] [-1.56] [0.22] [-2.93]***
ln(1+τ+g) 0.040 -0.133 0.214 0.115 0.099
[1.02] [-0.77] [2.01]** [1.55] [1.23]
SUPPLIERS 0.010 -0.017 0.002 0.011 0.083
[0.51] [-0.25] [0.03] [0.28] [1.51]
JSUPPLIERS 0.021 0.042 -0.081 0.104 0.048
[1.29] [0.56] [-1.52] [3.88]*** [1.11]
LOCSALES 0.124 0.137 0.088 0.143 0.106
[14.18]*** [3.14]*** [3.73]*** [9.83]*** [4.59]***
SHARE -0.017 -0.028 -0.029 0.023 -0.053
[-1.29] [-0.49] [-0.93] [0.79] [-1.49]
R&D -0.164 0.287 0.000 0.021 0.154
[-1.50] [0.17] [-0.00] [0.10] [0.59]
EXPER -0.007 0.008 -0.007 -0.004 0.001
[-3.56]*** [0.45] [-1.38] [-0.98] [0.16]
EXPER × ASEAN dummy 0.015 -0.024 0.019 0.012 0.009
[5.21]*** [-1.25] [1.99]** [2.16]** [1.37]
EXPER × China dummy 0.020 0.028 0.014 0.033 0.016
[6.39]*** [1.66]* [1.41] [5.43]*** [1.79]*
EXPER × NIES dummy 0.009 -0.027 0.013 0.006 -0.002
[3.54]*** [-1.49] [2.02]** [1.33] [-0.30]
EXPER × Europe dummy 0.008 -0.019 0.005 0.011 -0.001
[2.59]*** [-0.97] [0.71] [1.97]** [-0.18]
EXPER × Other Countries dummy 0.007 -0.013 0.007 -0.002 -0.003
[1.85]* [-0.69] [0.74] [-0.21] [-0.44]
Constant -0.131 0.535 0.515 -0.621 -2.128
[-0.26] [0.31] [0.35] [-0.63] [-1.51]
N 21117 1555 2397 5547 3068
Number of affiliates 6366 465 667 1606 926
R
2 (within) 0.030 0.063 0.032 0.052 0.045
For notes and sources, see Table 3.Table 8.  Estimation Resutls of Cost Function: Differences between Developed and Developing Countries









lnPL -0.012 0.015 0.008 -0.023 -0.075
[-1.52] [0.47] [0.37] [-1.46] [-2.66]***
lnY 0.035 -0.013 0.041 0.012 0.022
[7.52]*** [-0.68] [3.12]*** [1.34] [2.39]**
lnPM -0.004 -0.065 0.023 0.103 -0.276
[-0.13] [-0.49] [0.31] [1.42] [-2.98]***
SUPPLIERS -0.227 -0.328 0.034 0.066 -0.558
[-2.23]** [-0.83] [0.17] [0.31] [-2.20]**
JSUPPLIERS -0.011 0.017 -0.104 0.030 0.014
[-0.41] [0.25] [-1.19] [0.63] [0.19]
LOCSALES 0.072 0.068 0.011 0.040 0.123
[5.53]*** [0.77] [0.33] [1.82]* [3.94]***
SHARE 0.001 -0.037 -0.005 0.062 -0.057
[0.07] [-0.42] [-0.13] [1.44] [-1.09]
R&D -0.100 2.862 -0.160 0.372 0.081
[-0.66] [0.77] [-0.23] [1.39] [0.18]
EXPER 0.002 0.005 -0.007 -0.004 0.024
[0.60] [0.33] [-0.96] [-0.56] [2.44]**
Constant 6.221 8.957 -0.464 -1.828 15.451
[2.30]** [0.87] [-0.08] [-0.33] [2.27]**
N 7243 218 1148 1681 1297
Number of affiliates 2159 61 305 485 381
R
2 (within) 0.019 0.028 0.016 0.012 0.045
Elasticity of substitution 0.745 -2.775 2.409 7.112 -14.562
Developing countries
lnPL 0.003 -0.004 -0.024 0.000 -0.001
[0.54] [-0.12] [-1.09] [0.05] [-0.03]
lnY 0.025 0.017 0.035 0.016 0.033
[8.69]*** [1.50] [3.57]*** [2.95]*** [5.40]***
lnPM -0.031 -0.080 -0.004 -0.014 -0.076
[-2.33]** [-1.95]* [-0.08] [-0.48] [-2.38]**
SUPPLIERS 0.015 0.091 0.018 0.034 0.050
[0.72] [1.15] [0.28] [0.93] [0.82]
JSUPPLIERS 0.057 -0.138 -0.050 0.143 0.093
[2.81]*** [-1.21] [-0.81] [4.56]*** [1.97]**
LOCSALES 0.163 0.183 0.167 0.202 0.093
[14.00]*** [3.71]*** [4.92]*** [10.75]*** [2.65]***
SHARE -0.029 -0.003 -0.044 -0.006 -0.046
[-1.51] [-0.04] [-0.92] [-0.17] [-0.95]
R&D -0.208 -0.833 0.229 -0.413 0.303
[-1.34] [-0.42] [0.34] [-1.29] [0.95]
EXPER 0.005 -0.001 0.004 0.007 0.005
[2.87]*** [-0.17] [0.74] [2.14]** [0.94]
Constant -0.531 -1.652 -0.291 -1.391 -1.692
[-1.00] [-0.83] [-0.17] [-1.44] [-1.05]
N 13874 1337 1249 3866 1771
Number of affiliates 4207 404 362 1121 545
R
2 (within) 0.036 0.028 0.050 0.064 0.056
Elasticity of substitution -0.466 -1.698 0.792 0.119 -2.711
For notes and sources, see Table 3.Table A1. Number of Foreign Affiliates, by Industry
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Textiles 132 170 186 234 275 284 274
Chemical 174 231 307 307 397 460 459
Basic metal 90 153 159 153 205 236 246
Fabricated metal products 69 58 81 90 118 124 113
General machinery 217 271 315 327 383 439 445
Electric machinery 517 652 733 748 869 991 1,037
Transportation equipment 236 358 428 481 531 505 529
Precision instruments and machinery 53 99 79 95 110 130 131
Other manufacturing 334 462 479 493 607 613 635
Total 1,822 2,454 2,767 2,928 3,495 3,782 3,869
Table A2. Number of Foreign Affiliates, by Country
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
China 116 281 415 512 604 664 696
United States 419 558 554 555 651 660 647
Thailand 155 209 232 248 308 350 362
Malaysia 141 161 185 182 233 254 269
Indonesia 83 113 136 166 235 237 265
Taiwan 170 197 206 202 234 250 257
Singapore 120 145 162 144 180 192 186
Hong Kong 70 106 122 129 141 165 161
Korea 93 115 118 120 127 149 157
United Kingdom 94 118 117 117 132 134 141
Philippine 34 46 77 95 106 124 126
Germany 74 80 95 84 92 108 111
France 36 36 46 47 58 66 62
Vietnam 1 5 14 29 42 53 60
Canada 36 33 48 48 51 64 57
Brazil 40 54 47 46 55 52 55
India 12 19 22 34 43 51 50
Australia 28 41 34 31 42 39 43
Mexico 19 38 31 25 37 40 38
Netherlands 24 29 26 32 32 36 37
Spain 15 24 28 26 27 25 28
Italy 18 18 23 23 27 30 28
Belgium 16 17 20 24 23 27 24
New Zealand 4866 1 087
Argentina 4333542
Total 1,822 2,454 2,767 2,928 3,495 3,782 3,869Table A3. The List of Variables
Variable Definition Expected signs Source
Local porcurements The ratio of local purchase to total cost The METI survey
Local inputs share The ratio of local purchase to total purchase The METI survey
lnPL Log of average wage of Japanese overseas affiliates, by country and industry ? The METI survey
lnY Log of sales deflated by GDP deflator ? IMF (2004) and the METI survey
lnL Log of the number of employment ? The METI survey
lnPM=lnP'M+ln(1+τ+g) Price of the imported intermediate goods  +
     lnP'M Price of the imported intermediate goods from Japan BOJ (2004) and IMF (2004)
     ln(1+τ+g) Log of trade cost IMF (2004) and World Bank (2004)
EXPER Experience (the length of opeartion) + The METI survey
LOCSALES The ratio of local sales to total sales + The METI survey
SUPPLIERS The value of manufacturing GDP + World Bank (2004)
JSUPPLIERS Log of the number of Japanese affiliates, by country and industry + The METI survey
SHARE Equity share of Japanese parent firm - The METI survey
R&D The ratio of R&D to total sales - Basic survey of Business Structure and Activity
LCR The strictness of local content regulations in the host country. + The METI survey
ENTRYMODE Ownership status at the entry
* 1 green field  The METI survey
2 green field (Joint Venture) The METI survey
3 take over The METI survey
4 capital participation  The METI survey
* "Ownership status at the entry" is available only for those firms who have replied to benchmark survey conducted in 1992, 1995 and 1998.Table A4. Basic Statistics
Variable N Mean S.D. Min Max
Local porcurements 21117 0.375 0.316 0 1.000
Local inputs share 21117 0.468 0.379 0 1
lnPL 21117 0.464 1.346 -8.188 4.139
lnY 21117 7.584 1.972 -6.407 14.344
lnL 20913 4.791 1.614 0 10.519
lnPM 21117 1.047 0.351 0.027 2.507
lnP'M 21117 5.035 0.937 -3.863 7.006
ln(1+τ+g) 21117 0.165 0.108 0 0.952
JSUPPLIERS 21117 3.952 1.136 0 5.861
LCRSALES 21117 0.644 0.393 0 1
SHARE 21117 0.792 0.264 0 1
SUPPLIERS 21117 27.725 2.247 23.545 33.380
EXPER 21117 10.544 8.563 0 81
LCR 5949 0.113 0.052 0 0.306
ENTRYMODE1 18763 0.405 0.491 0 1
ENTRYMODE2 18763 0.462 0.499 0 1
ENTRYMODE3 18763 0.068 0.252 0 1
ENTRYMODE4 18763 0.065 0.246 0 1
R&D 21117 0.033 0.032 0 0.629




















Local inputs share 0.926 1
lnPL 0.033 0.046 1
lnY 0.080 -0.005 0.516 1
lnL 0.089 0.070 -0.221 0.491 1
lnPM -0.009 0.001 -0.004 0.053 0.188 1
lnP'M -0.016 -0.021 0.481 0.376 0.049 0.669 1
ln(1+τ+g) 0.049 0.065 -0.386 -0.249 0.168 0.307 -0.216 1
JSUPPLIERS 0.162 0.182 0.101 0.003 0.020 0.116 0.179 0.082 1
LCRSALES 0.126 0.142 0.191 0.014 -0.154 -0.115 -0.110 0.050 0.090 1
SHARE -0.180 0.176 0.208 0.086 -0.112 -0.206 -0.083 -0.132 -0.056 -0.134 1
SUPPLIERS 0.051 0.071 -0.021 0.005 0.143 0.694 0.378 0.171 0.209 0.030 -0.227 1
EXPER 0.046 0.020 0.116 0.244 0.146 -0.190 -0.152 -0.143 -0.116 0.109 0.021 -0.091 1
LCR 0.001 0.011 -0.453 -0.237 0.212 0.319 0.025 0.452 0.203 -0.077 -0.209 0.304 -0.184 1
ENTRYMODE1 -0.169 -0.194 0.137 0.069 -0.133 -0.229 -0.089 -0.133 -0.069 -0.088 0.502 -0.246 0.011 -0.166 1
ENTRYMODE2 0.078 0.076 -0.221 -0.117 0.100 0.259 0.121 0.107 0.066 0.038 -0.454 0.259 -0.019 0.237 -0.754 1
ENTRYMODE3 0.108 0.145 0.154 0.078 0.023 -0.081 -0.049 0.023 0.028 0.047 0.110 -0.077 -0.016 -0.132 -0.229 -0.261 1
ENTRYMODE4 0.064 0.076 0.012 0.018 0.037 0.017 -0.016 0.022 -0.026 0.048 -0.194 0.044 0.033 -0.012 -0.217 -0.248 -0.075 1
R&D -0.120 -0.133 0.094 0.211 0.118 -0.047 -0.031 -0.036 -0.187 0.029 0.069 -0.025 0.097 -0.058 0.059 -0.058 -0.023 0.026 1Figure 1.   Local Procurement Ratio  in 2000
Note: Average local procurement ratio is 0.38, 0.36, 0.30, and 0.42 for textiles, general machinery, electric machinery, and transportation
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